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Abstract	  
Iraq,	   Turkey,	   and	   the	   Kurdistan	   Regional	   Government	   are	   in	   tense	   political	   relations	   over	   recent	  
energy	   politics	   and	   regional	   dynamics.	  While	  major	   international	   interests	   related	   to	   oil	   and	   gas	  
resources	  might	   currently	   be	   at	   stake,	   historic	  mistrusts	   and	   deeper	   political	   challenges	   seem	   to	  
stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  a	  peaceful	  trilateral	  cooperation.	  While	  energy	  deals	  with	  the	  Kurdistan	  Regional	  
Government	  grow	  apace,	  Ankara	  seems	  to	  stand	  both	  as	  an	  active	  gambler	  and	  a	  key	  facilitator.	  The	  
domestic	  and	  regional	  dynamics	  unfolding	   in	  Turkey	  will	   likely	  be	   indicators	  of	  whether	  a	  durable	  
peace	  situation	  can	  succeed	  over	   long-­‐standing	  political	  obstacles	  and	  historical	  tensions	  between	  
the	  countries.	  
Background 
Stretching	  for	  more	  than	  600	  km	  from	  northern	  Iraq	  through	  Turkey’s	  southern	  borders,	  the	  Kirkuk-­‐
Ceylan	   pipeline	   has	   linked	   Iraqi	   oil	   to	  western	  markets	   for	   decades.	  Despite	   frequent	   disruptions	  
linked	  to	  the	  Kurdistan	  Workers’	  Party	  (PKK)	  terrorist	  attacks	  over	  the	  years	  (Today’s	  Zaman,	  2012),	  
the	  Kirkuk-­‐Ceylan	  pipeline	  has	  long	  remained	  one	  of	  the	  symbols	  of	  Baghdad’s	  historical	  partnership	  
with	   Ankara.	   The	   autonomous	   Kurdistan	   Regional	   Government	   (KRG),	   however,	   has	   emerged	   in	  
recent	   years	   as	   a	   potential	   competitor,	   seeking	   to	   use	   oil	   and	   gas	   reserves	   to	   secure	   its	   own	  
economic	  future	  and	  political	  autonomy.	  In	  the	  middle	  of	  these	  balances,	  Turkey	  stands	  both	  as	  an	  
indispensable	  transit	  route	  and	  a	  key	  facilitator.	  Torn	  between	  its	  energy-­‐hungry	  economy’s	  needs	  
and	  the	  historical	  relations	  with	  Baghdad,	  Ankara	  lingers	  with	  a	  foot	  in	  both	  camps.	  	  
While	  major	  regional	  and	  international	  economic	  interests	  are	  currently	  at	  stake,	  Iraq,	  the	  KRG,	  
and	   Turkey	   carefully	   walk	   through	   a	   delicate	   political	   tightrope.	   Aware	   of	   their	   strategic	  
interdependence,	  it	  is	  not	  sure	  whether	  they	  will	  be	  able	  to	  turn	  these	  uneasy	  balances	  into	  a	  triple	  
win-­‐win-­‐win	  game	  (Council	  of	  European	  Union,	  2013).	  
Erbil	  and	  Baghdad,	  Brothers	  and	  Foes	  
Relations	  between	  the	  federal	  government	  of	  Baghdad	  and	  the	  KRG	  have	  long	  been	  strained	  (Mills,	  
2013,	  p.	  54).	  The	  source	  of	  political	  contention	  ultimately	  falls	  down	  to	  the	  question	  of	  KRG’s	  right	  
to	  sign	   independent	  oil	  exploration	  contracts	  and	  to	  the	  profit	  shares	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  oil	   revenues.	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This	   controversy	   has	   its	   roots	   in	   the	   times	   of	   the	   American	   occupation	   of	   Iraq	   (2003-­‐2011),	   as	   a	  
national	  oil	  law	  draft	  to	  regulate	  these	  questions	  had	  been	  a	  benchmark	  of	  the	  US	  President	  George	  
W.	   Bush	   administration	   and	   was	   required	   by	   the	   2005	   Iraqi	   Constitution.	   Despite	   of	   foreign	  
mediation,	  the	  two	  sides	  were	  not	  able	  to	  reach	  a	  deal,	  and	  when	  American	  troops	  withdraw	  from	  
the	  Iraqi	  soil	  in	  2011,	  Baghdad	  and	  Erbil	  were	  left	  in	  a	  perpetual	  clash	  over	  how	  to	  divide	  profits	  and	  
who	   had	   the	   authority	   to	   sign	   deals	   with	   international	   oil	   companies	   (Arango	   &	   Kraus,	   2013).	  
According	   to	   Erbil,	   the	   Iraqi	   constitution	   entitles	   the	   KRG	   to	   sign	   contracts	   for	   all	   the	   fields	  
discovered	   after	   its	   enactment	   (Tol,	   2013b).	   This	  would	  mean	   essentially	   all	   oil	   fields,	   since	   only	  
three	  were	  discovered	  prior	   the	  approval	  of	   the	  constitution	   (Mills,	  2013).	  Baghdad,	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	  claims	  that	  KRG’s	  unilateral	  actions	  are	  circumventing	  the	  central	  government’s	  authority	  and	  
fostering	   the	   country’s	   divisions	   by	   developing	   a	   separate	   energy	   deals	   without	   the	   central	  
government’s	   consent	   (Tol,	   2013a).	   Strong	   criticism	   was	   also	   directed	   to	   all	   international	   oil	  
companies	  that	  signed	  contracts	  with	  the	  KRG,	  such	  as	  the	  Chinese	  Sinopec,	  and	  the	  American	  Hess	  
and	  ExxonMobil	  (Kirdar,	  2012).	  
In	   this	   context,	   the	   cutting	   of	   a	   bilateral	   agreement	   to	   build	   one	   gas	   and	   two	   oil	   pipelines	  
directly	   from	  northern	   Iraq	  to	  Turkey	   in	  May	  2012	  (Tocci,	  2013,	  p.	  3)	  has	   inflamed	  an	  already	  hot	  
political	   debate,	   accusing	   Erbil	   of	   being	   willing	   to	   divide	   the	   country	   for	   its	   own	   economic	  
aspirations.	  However,	  when	  the	  question	  is	  seen	  from	  a	  wider	  perspective,	  a	  different	  image	  comes	  
into	   the	   frame.	   Erbil's	   oil	   and	   gas	   reserves	   are	   relatively	  modest	   if	   compared	   to	   the	   ones	   of	   the	  
central	   government	   (Mills,	   2013,	   p.	   54).	   Baghdad’s	   reserves	   are	   in	   fact	   esteemed	   at	   143	   billion	  
barrels	  (bbl)	  of	  oil,	  the	  fifth	  largest	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  127	  trillion	  cubic	  feet	  (tcf)	  of	  gas	  (Kirdar,	  2012).	  
Its	  oil	  fields,	  such	  as	  the	  Majnoon	  field	  in	  the	  area	  of	  Basra,	  are	  among	  the	  largest	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  
Iraqi	   Kurds,	   in	   contrast,	   can	   count	  on	  a	  modest	   amount	  of	   12	  billion	  bbl	  of	  oil	   and	  22	   tcf	   of	   gas,	  
globally	  representing	  just	  one	  tenth	  of	  Iraq’s	  total	  resources	  (Mills,	  2013,	  p.	  52).	  While	  surely	  more	  
autonomous	  than	  the	  past,	  Erbil	  appears	  more	  similar	  to	  a	   little	  brother	  under	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	  
central	   government.	   Could	   it	   represent	   a	   real	   threat	   to	   Baghdad’s	   autonomy	   and	   future	   political	  
stability?	  
A	  Kurdish	  Threat?	  
In	  December	  2013,	  in	  front	  of	  an	  audience	  of	  nearly	  eight	  hundred	  professionals	  of	  the	  international	  
oil	   industry,	   the	   KRG	   announced	   that	   the	   first	   pipeline	   to	   the	   Turkish	   border	   was	   complete	   and	  
ready	  to	  transport	  300,000	  barrels	  a	  day,	  probably	  a	  million	  a	  day	  by	  2015	  (Rudaw,	  2013).	  Beyond	  
the	   initial	   enthusiasm,	  however,	   the	  question	  of	   the	   revenues	  of	   these	  exchanges	  and	  Baghdad’s	  
accusations	  still	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  the	  Iraqi-­‐Turkish	  embrace.	  A	  first	  effort	  to	  solve	  the	  contention	  
had	  brought	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  Kurdistan	  Region	  Masoud	  Barzani,	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  
Iraq	  Nouri	  al-­‐Maliki	  to	  sign	  a	  first	  yet	  important	  deal	  in	  April	  2013	  (Idiz,	  2013).	  The	  parts	  maintained	  
their	  will	  to	  draft	  a	  national	  oil	  law	  and	  a	  special	  committee	  was	  supposed	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  historical	  
objects	  of	  contentions	  between	  the	  two	  governments	  (Mills,	  2013,	  p.	  54).	  Further	  expectations	  rose	  
from	  a	  mutual	  exchange	  of	  visits	  between	  al-­‐Maliki	  and	  Barzani	  in	  the	  summer,	  but	  the	  agreement	  
has	   not	   been	   implemented	   and	   the	   discussions	   regarding	   the	   profit	   shares	   of	   the	   Kurdish	   oil	  
revenues,	   as	   well	   as	   its	   right	   to	   sign	   independent	   oil	   exploration	   contracts,	   remain	   largely	  
unresolved.	  	  
While	  talks	  are	  mainly	  focusing	  on	  the	  economic	  disputes,	  however,	  political	  reasons	  appear	  to	  
be	   the	   real	   fears	   in	   the	  shadow	  of	   the	  contention.	  KRG’s	  growing	  economic	  autonomy	   is	   seen	  by	  
Baghdad	  as	  a	  Trojan	  horse	  to	  pursue	  the	  path	   for	  an	   increasing	  political	   independency	   (Arango	  &	  
Kraus,	  2013).	  This	  happens	   in	  a	  geopolitical	  situation	   in	  which	  Kurdish	   leaders	   in	  Syria	  and	  Turkey	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are	   taking	  decisive	   steps	   towards	  greater	  autonomy.	  On	   the	  Syrian	   side,	   the	  armed	   troops	  of	   the	  
Syrian	  Kurdish	  movement	  of	   the	  PYD	   (Democratic	  Union	  Party)	   recently	  declared	  an	  autonomous	  
administration	  in	  the	  country’s	  northeastern	  region	  (Durukan,	  2013).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  since	  March	  
2013	  Ankara	  has	  engaged	  in	  negotiations	  with	  the	  PKK,	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  ending	  their	  three-­‐decades	  
long	  and	  deadly	  armed	  struggle.	  Part	  of	  the	  debate	  around	  the	  Kurdish	  question	  in	  Turkey	  focuses	  
on	  the	  possibility	  to	  grant	  to	  the	  Kurdish	  regions	  of	  the	  southeast	  a	  form	  of	  greater	  administrative	  
autonomy.	  While	   tens	  of	  millions	  of	  Kurds	   living	  between	   Iraq,	   Syria,	   and	  Turkey	   see	   for	   the	   first	  
time	  their	   long	  held	  ambitions	  for	   independence	  advancing,	  Baghdad’s	   fears	  of	  a	  split	  of	   Iraq	  find	  
fertile	  ground	  to	  blossom.	  In	  this	  tangled	  mix	  of	  fears	  and	  economic	  gains,	  Turkey	  is	  called	  into	  both	  
mediation	  and	  challenge:	   it	   is	  Ankara,	  apparently,	  who	  holds	   the	  higher	  stakes	   in	   the	   increasingly	  
troubled	  energy	  triangle.	  
Turkey:	  Peace	  Dove	  or	  Active	  Gambler?	  
With	   its	  thriving	  economy	  and	  impressive	  growth	  rate,	  Ankara’s	  energy	  hunger	   is	  rapidly	  growing.	  
While	  domestic	  energy	  consumption	  rises	  by	  6-­‐8	  percent	  per	  year	  (Tocci,	  2013),	  Turkey	  has	  hit	  the	  
top	  of	  the	  list	  of	  members	  of	  the	  International	  Energy	  Agency	  for	  total	  energy	  consumption	  (Koranyi	  
&	   Sartori,	   2013).	   The	   high	   dependency	   over	   expensive	   Russian	   and	   Iranian	   gas	   has	   made	  
diversification	  a	  key	   issue	  and	  Kurdish	   resources	  even	  more	  appealing.	  Thanks	   to	   the	  agreements	  
over	  prices	  signed	  between	  Ankara	  and	  Erbil,	  KRG’s	  supplies	  could	   in	   fact	  be	  three	  times	  cheaper	  
than	  Russian	  and	  Iranian	  ones,	  according	  to	  international	  experts	  (Tol,	  2013b).	  	  
The	  awareness	  of	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  KRG	  as	  an	  ally	  in	  the	  energy	  field	  strongly	  contrasted	  the	  
structural	  suspicion	  that	  Ankara	  has	  held	  towards	  Iraqi	  Kurds	  for	  decades.	  Accusing	  Erbil	  to	  act	  as	  a	  
safe-­‐harbor	   of	   Kurdish	   armed	   militants,	   Turkey	   has	   historically	   privileged	   its	   relations	   with	   the	  
central	   government.	  This	   situation	   started	   to	   change	   since	  2007,	  when	  Turkey	  was	  able	   to	   target	  
PKK	  training	  camps	  in	  the	  Kandil	  Mountains	  due	  to	  American	  extensive	  intelligence	  sharing	  (Tocci,	  
2013,	   p.	   3).	   As	   Ankara	   gained	   control	   over	   the	   area,	   KRG’s	   image	   of	   a	   safe-­‐haven	   for	   terrorists	  
started	   to	   fade	   and	   Erbil	   became	  more	   an	   opportunity	   rather	   than	   a	   threat	   for	   Turkey.	   Stronger	  
political	   ties	   and	   a	   blossoming	   economic	   cooperation	   have	   led	   Ankara	   to	   take	   a	   surprising	   yet	  
strategic	  U-­‐turn.	   The	  number	  of	   Turkish	   firms	  operating	   in	   northern	   Iraq	   suddenly	  bounced	   from	  
730	   in	  2010	  to	  nearly	  1,023	   in	  April	  2012	  and	  soon	  Turkey	  became	  KRG’s	  main	  economic	  partner	  
(Tocci,	  2013).	  As	  it	  was	  easy	  to	  foresee,	  Turkey’s	  honeymoon	  with	  Erbil	  soon	  strained	  relations	  with	  
Baghdad.	   Tensions	   grew	   apace	   and	   reached	   its	   peak	   in	   November	   2012	  when	  Minister	   al-­‐Maliki	  
expelled	   a	   Turkish	   state	   company	   out	   of	   Iraq	   (Economist,	   2012)	   and	   denied	   landing	   rights	   to	  
Ankara’s	   Energy	   Minister	   Taner	   Yildiz	   (Zeyrek,	   2012).	   Despite	   Ankara’s	   efforts	   to	   bridge	   this	  
diplomatic	  crisis,	   relations	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  are	  still	   strained,	  with	  Baghdad	  accusing	   its	  
former	  ally	   to	  spark	  divisions	   in	   its	  country	  and	  threaten	   its	  own	  sovereignty.	  While	  Turkey	  keeps	  
trying	  to	  reassure	  the	  central	  government	  that	  it	  will	  not	  be	  sidelined	  in	  any	  new	  agreements	  with	  
Erbil,	  it	  is	  still	  stuck	  in	  an	  uneasy	  balance	  between	  Erbil	  and	  Baghdad	  (Kohen,	  2013).	  
The	  Turkish-­‐Kurdish	  Variable	  	  
From	  whatever	   perspective	   we	   view	   the	   question	   of	   power-­‐balances	   between	   Turkey,	   KRG,	   and	  
Iraq,	   the	   Kurdish-­‐Turkish	   minority	   seems	   to	   play	   an	   important	   key	   role	   for	   establishing	   a	   stable	  
trilateral	  peace.	  The	  success	  of	  the	  energy	  partnerships	  between	  Ankara,	  Erbil,	  and	  Baghdad,	  seem	  
to	   a	   large	   extent	   dependent	   on	   the	   peaceful	   resolution	   of	   Turkey’s	   Kurdish	   question	   (Candar,	  
2013a).	  The	  pipelines	  connecting	  Iraq	  to	  Turkey	  have	  always	  been	  a	  strategic	  target	  of	  PKK	  attacks,	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forcing	  both	  countries	  to	  keep	  the	  route	  largely	  inactive	  (Tol,	  2013b).	  With	  the	  new	  conduct	  built	  by	  
the	  KRG	  almost	  complete,	  the	  settlement	  of	  Turkey’s	  Kurdish	  question	  stands	  as	  a	  key	  to	  assure	  the	  
investor’s	  interests	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  Turkish	  government	  has	  undertaken	  its	  steps,	  notably	  through	  
the	   presentation	   of	   a	   democratic	   reform	   package	   with	   several	   provisions	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   Kurds,	  
adopted	   on	   September	   30,	   2013.	   However,	   the	   Kurdish	   minority	   claims	   that	   the	   reform	   is	  
unsatisfactory	  (Taraf,	  2013),	  threatening	  to	  abandon	  the	  recent	  breakthrough	  in	  peace	  negotiations	  
between	  the	  Turkish	  state	  and	  PKK.	  The	  clashes	  that	  occurred	  between	  police	  and	  protesters	  in	  the	  
Kurdish	  Hakkari	  Province	  on	  December	  6,	  2013	  and	  the	  kidnapping	  of	  four	  Turkish	  soldiers	  by	  PKK	  
militants	   in	  December	  8	   (Radikal,	   2013),	  have	  brought	  Turkey	   to	   fear	   that	   the	   ceasefire	  with	  PKK	  
might	  be	  broken.	  Should	  this	  happen,	  not	  only	  the	  deals	  on	  the	  new	  pipelines	  but	  also	  the	  whole	  
energy	  crossroads	  between	  Turkey,	  Iraq,	  and	  KRG	  could	  be	  put	  at	  stake.	  	  
The	   ultimate	   prospects	   of	   the	   trilateral	   relations	   on	   regional	   energy	   resources	   appear	   to	   be	  
closely	   intertwined	   with	   deeper	   political	   challenges	   as	   well	   as	   with	   the	   uncertain	   futures	   of	   the	  
Kurdish	   population	   living	   between	   Turkey,	   Syria	   and	   Iraq.	   Historic	   fears	   and	   ongoing	   mistrusts	  
suggest	   that	   no	   stable	   peace	   nor	   fruitful	   economic	   exchanges	   will	   be	   achieved	   until	   a	   political	  
balance	  with	   the	   Kurdish	   population	   living	   in	   between	   the	   three	   countries	   has	   been	   found.	  Only	  
time	  will	   tell	  what	   impact	   these	  dynamics	  are	  going	  to	  have	  on	  the	  destiny	  of	   the	  region	  and	  the	  
future	  cooperation	  in	  the	  troubled	  triangle	  between	  Ankara,	  Erbil	  and	  Baghdad.	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